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Remittance inflows have increased considerably in recent years and are large relative to the size 
of many recipient economies. The theoretical and empirical effects of remittance inflows on 
output growth volatility are, however, ambiguous. On the one hand, remittances have been a 
remarkably stable source of income, relative to other private and public flows, and they seem to 
be compensatory in nature, rising when the home country’s economy suffers a downturn. On the 
other hand, the labor supply effects induced by altruistic remittances could cause the output 
effects associated with technology shocks to be magnified. This paper finds robust evidence for a 
sample of 70 remittance-recipient countries, including 16 advanced economies and 54 
developing countries that remittances have a negative effect on output growth volatility, thereby 
supporting the notion that remittance flows are a stabilizing influence on output.  
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 I.   INTRODUCTION 
Remittance inflows have increased considerably in recent years and have become quite large 
relative to the size of many recipient economies.  There is evidence that these flows behave very 
differently from other resource flows to developing countries, including both private and official 
capital flows, FDI, and aid.  In particular, remittances are private household to household 
transfers often involving transactions between economic agents that are altruistically linked.  
They have been a remarkably stable source of income relative to other private and public flows, 
and they seem to be compensatory in nature, rising when the home country’s economy suffers a 
downturn. This combination of stability and countercyclicality has led some to believe that 
remittances play a stabilizing role at the aggregate level in recipient countries.  
 
However, while these characteristics of remittance flows may suggest that they should be 
expected to play a stabilizing role, the issue is not clear-cut, either theoretically or empirically.  
From a theoretical perspective, some observers have noted that the labor supply effects induced 
by altruistic remittances could cause the output effects associated with technology shocks to be 
magnified (see Chami, Cosimano and Gapen, 2006).  Empirically, while remittance flows may 
be more stable than other foreign exchange inflows, they are not insensitive to macroeconomic 
developments in the source countries, and thus represent a potential channel for the international 
transmission of business cycles, implying that greater “openness” to remittance flows, other 
things equal, may not be stabilizing.  The current global slowdown, for example, adversely 
affected the demand for migrant labor in both the industrialized and the Persian Gulf countries, 
the main sources of remittance income.  Consequently, remittance flows have fallen for the first 
time in decades. According to a recent World Bank report, remittance flows are estimated to have fallen by 5 to 8 percent in 2009. Other studies report that remittances to Philippines, 
Mexico, the Middle East and Africa dropped considerably. For example, Cali and others (2008) 
report that remittances to Kenya fell by 38% in 2008.  
 
The adverse effect of high output volatility on economic growth was first emphasized by 
Ramey and Ramey (1995), and output volatility has also been recognized to have direct adverse 
effects on welfare, particularly where opportunities for consumption smoothing are limited. The 
issue of whether a large role of remittance receipts tends on average to be stabilizing or 
otherwise is therefore an important one, particularly in the context of developing countries, 
where both growth and stability objectives are highly valued.    
 
This paper is an empirical investigation into the issue of whether the size of remittance 
flows is an important determinant of growth volatility. We employ cross-section OLS and 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel regressions to explain the standard deviation of 
real per capita GDP growth for a sample of 70 countries, including 16 advanced economies and 
54 developing countries. Our objective is to determine whether the ratio of remittance receipts to 
GDP helps to explain the volatility of growth in these economies after controlling for a large 
number of variables that have been cited in the literature as potential determinants of such 
volatility. We find a robust, statistically significant negative effect of remittance flows on the 
volatility of real GDP growth: in other words, remittance inflows have tended to be stabilizing on 
average.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows: to isolate the effect of remittance inflows on 
growth volatility, it is important to properly control for other potential determinants of growth 
volatility. Accordingly, Section II provides an overview of the literature on the determinants of 
growth volatility that is intended to identify the appropriate set of controls. Our first estimates, 
based on cross-section OLS regressions, are presented in Section III. To handle the potential 
endogeneity of remittance flows, Section IV relies on panel GMM estimations respectively. In 
Section V, we consider the possibility that the effects of remittance flows on the stability of GDP 
growth may be nonlinear. A final section summarizes and concludes. The paper also contains a 
data appendix describing sources for the data used in the estimations as well as variable 
definitions. 
 
II.   DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH VOLATILITY 
A stylized fact of cross-country growth performance is that growth rates are not very persistent 
(Easterly, Kremer, and Summers, 1993). This volatility in growth rates is important not only for 
its direct welfare effects, but also because it may affect the average growth rate itself, as 
mentioned above. Consequently, there is a growing literature attempting to explain growth 
volatility.  The explanations that have been adduced to date tend to emphasize factors of three 
types: exogenous shocks, persistent characteristics of the domestic economic and policy 
environment that are responsible for generating or amplifying shocks, and deeper institutional 
factors making for social, political, and economic instability. We review each of these in 
succession, and conclude the section with a brief description of the effects of remittance flows on 
volatility that have been identified in the literature to date. 
 A.   Exogenous Shocks 
Easterly, Kremer and Summers (1993) note that the lack of persistence in growth rates in the 
face of substantial persistence in the types of explanatory variables typically included in cross-
country growth regressions suggests an important role for low-persistence shocks in determining 
growth rates. Empirically, they find that changes in decade-average growth rates are highly 
correlated with changes in the terms of trade, with variations in civil strife (measured by war 
casualties on domestic soil), with vulnerability to debt crises, and with changes in inflows of 
external transfers as a share of GDP.  These results have been confirmed with more recent data 
by Calderon, Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005). Using a sample of 76 countries over the period 
1960-2000, they find that growth volatility is significantly affected by low-persistence external 
shocks. These include shocks to the terms of trade, to resource inflows, and to partner-country 
growth.  Recent research has also highlighted an important effect of domestic policy shocks – 
especially higher volatility in discretionary fiscal spending measured as the standard deviation of 
cyclically adjusted government spending--for increasing output volatility (see Fatás and Mihov 
2003, and Hakura, 2009). 
 
B.   Persistent Country Characteristics 
Subsequent work has focused on the roles of more persistent economic characteristics on 
volatility. Such characteristics include country size, income per capita, openness to trade, share 
of government consumption in GDP, degree of financial development, and degree of integration 
with world capital markets.   
 Furceri and Karras (2007) argue that country size matters because larger economies tend 
to have a more diversified structure of production, and thus are less vulnerable to sector-specific 
shocks. Their diversified production structure should therefore make larger countries more 
stable. The sectoral composition of domestic production may also be affected by a country’s 
level of development. Koren and Tenreyro (2004) argue that changes in income per capita are 
associated with patterns of sectoral specialization that have implications for macroeconomic 
volatility. Specifically, they find that as countries grow, they tend to concentrate production in 
less risky sectors. The degree of sectoral concentration in production also appears to decline 
initially with development, before flattening out and eventually reversing very gradually. Higher 
levels of income are also associated with reduced levels of country-specific risk, holding 
constant the structure of production. The upshot is that poor countries are more volatile because 
they have a less diversified production structure, because they specialize in more volatile types 
of production, and because they have other income-related characteristics that are associated 
with increased levels of domestic macroeconomic risk. 
 
The role of trade openness has proven to be more controversial. For example, Rodrik 
(1998) notes that increased trade openness tends to be associated with a larger share of 
government consumption in GDP across countries, and explains this correlation as the outcome 
of a social mechanism to cope with macroeconomic risk: he argues that increased openness is 
associated with higher macroeconomic volatility, especially when exports are highly 
concentrated and the prices of export goods are themselves volatile. Thus, it is not just the 
variability of international commodity prices that matters, or how large a weight specific 
commodities carry in the country’s export basket, but also how large exports are relative to the size of the economy. The latter two factors are persistent characteristics of the domestic economy 
that determine its vulnerability to fluctuations in commodity prices.  Rodrik argues that a large 
share of government consumption in GDP reduces risk, because the government sector is a 
“safe” sector in the sense that the level of government employment as well as of government 
purchases from the rest of the economy are relatively stable. He argues that more open 
economies can therefore achieve enhanced income stability by increasing the share of 
government consumption in GDP.  The upshot is that increased trade openness, a larger share of 
exports devoted to primary commodities, and more volatile terms of trade should all be 
associated with increased macroeconomic volatility, while a larger share of government 
consumption in GDP should be associated with reduced volatility.
1 
 
Several authors have considered the roles of domestic financial development and capital 
account openness as determinants of volatility. Caballero (2000) argues that macroeconomic 
volatility in Latin America has been driven by two main factors: a low state of domestic financial 
development and weak links with international financial markets.  Both Easterly, Islam and 
Stiglitz (2000) as well as Cecchetti, Lagunes and Krause (2005) support the view that domestic 
financial sector development tends to reduce volatility.
2 However, while Caballero (2000) 
considers that weak financial integration enhances volatility in Latin America, other authors have 
                                                 
1 However, both components of Rodrik’s hypothesis have been disputed by others. Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 
(2000) note that the effect of trade openness on volatility may actually be ambiguous ex ante, since theory suggests 
that, while enhanced trade openness may leave a country more exposed to external shocks (as noted by Rodrik), it 
may be stabilizing in the face of domestic shocks. Moreover, government consumption has been shown to be 
volatile (Fatás and Mihov, 2003, and Hakura, 2009) as well as procyclical (Talvi and Vegh, Montiel and Serven 
2005) in many developing countries which suggests that a larger share of government consumption in GDP may 
actually enhance rather than reduce macroeconomic volatility in such countries. Accordingly, the effect of the share 
of government consumption in GDP on growth volatility may depend on a country’s income level. 
 
2 However, Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz conclude that the effect of financial development may be nonlinear, 
weakening at higher levels of financial development reached exactly the opposite conclusion.  Those who argue that financial openness is 
destabilizing emphasize two characteristics of capital flows that tend to be destabilizing: they 
tend to be procyclical (Stiglitz, 2000), and international capital markets may often respond in a 
disproportionate manner to domestic shocks, as noted in the “sudden stop” literature. 
 
C.   The Institutional Environment 
While budgetary institutions and financial sector development are two aspects of the domestic 
institutional environment that may affect macroeconomic volatility, several authors have 
emphasized that deeper aspects of the domestic institutional environment may be even more 
important in affecting volatility.  Rodrik (1998) for example, points to the quality of domestic 
institutions of internal conflict management. These affect macroeconomic volatility through the 
country’s response to external shocks. Such shocks often give rise to social conflict, and in 
countries with poor institutions of domestic conflict management, the result may be a growth 
collapse. This analysis points to indices of ethnic fragmentation, of democratic rights, and of the 
quality of government institutions, as potential “deep” empirical determinants of macroeconomic 
volatility.  Acemoglu and others (2003) go even further in linking volatility to the quality of the 
domestic institutional environment. They argue that an institutional environment that places only 
weak constraints on politicians and political elites itself generates volatility, even in the absence 
of exogenous shocks.  There is a variety of mechanisms that could generate this effect. For 
example, in the absence of such constraints, a turnover of power from one group to another is 
likely to imply the implementation of redistributive policies, which can be expected to 
destabilize aggregate economic performance. Moreover, since the opportunity to implement such 
policies implies that the group that obtains political power can make large economic gains for itself by doing so, jockeying for political power is likely to be intense under these circumstances, 
generating social conflict that manifests itself in macroeconomic instability.   
 
D.   Remittance Flows 
How do remittance flows fit into all this?  The theoretical effects of remittance inflows on 
macroeconomic volatility are ambiguous in principle.  The presence of remittance flows 
represents an additional dimension of macroeconomic openness, and to the extent that remittance 
flows are both exogenous and volatile, they would tend to induce volatility to the recipient 
economy much like volatility in the terms of trade or in capital flows.  However, the evidence 
suggests that remittances are both relatively stable, compared to other types of external flows, 
and that they behave countercyclically (see Chami and others, 2003, 2008, and references 
therein).  This being so, conditional on the quality of the domestic institutional environment, we 
would expect remittance flows to be macroeconomically stabilizing, in the same sense that 
countercyclical fiscal policy would be.   
 
However, there are several caveats to this argument. First, to the extent that fluctuations 
in growth are driven by labor-supply responses to technology shocks, countercyclical remittance 
flows may actually tend to amplify those responses – e.g. if a positive technology shock elicits an 
increase in labor supply because the real wage is temporarily high, and if remittance flows 
contract in response to the resulting increase in domestic income, the negative income effect 
associated with the contraction in remittances may reduce household demand for leisure, thereby 
magnifying the increase in the supply of labor. Thus, if income effects on the supply of labor are large and remittances are countercyclical, their presence may magnify volatility in GDP growth 
(see Chami and others, 2006). 
 
Remittance flows may also affect volatility through effects on the quality of domestic 
institutions. The presence of remittance flows may enhance financial development in the 
recipient country, a factor which, as mentioned above, has been found to be stabilizing. On the 
other hand, at a more fundamental level, the availability of remittance income may undermine 
the quality of other domestic economic institutions. There is evidence, for example, that reliance 
on remittance flows may have an adverse effect on the quality of governance in the recipient 
countries (Abdih and others, 2008). If so, the recipient economy may be more susceptible to 
being destabilized by economic shocks, whether domestic or external in origin. 
The evidence to date on the effects of remittance flows on volatility is limited and mixed. 
The IMF (2005) found that an increase in the share of remittance flows in GDP was associated 
with a (statistically and economically) significant reduction in volatility of GDP growth, 
suggesting that the stabilizing influence of countercyclical remittance flows on aggregate 
demand – and possibly the effects of such flows on domestic financial development – may 
outweigh their supply-side and institutional effects. These results were supported by Bugamelli 
and Paterno (2008), who found that remittance flows reduced growth volatility in a cross-section 
of 60 emerging and developing economies after controlling for trade and financial openness, 
financial development, and volatility of monetary policy. More recently, Craigwell, Jackman and 
Moore (2010), using a large country panel, found heterogeneous effects across various country 
groupings. On average (for the full sample), remittance flows helped to mitigate the effects of 
adverse output shocks, but exerted no significant influence on consumption and investment volatility.  For small island economies, they found that, while larger remittance flows tended to 
reduce output volatility, remittances played an important role in transmitting international 
business cycles (Jackman, Craigwell, and Moore, 2010). By contrast, Neagu and Schiff (2009), 
using a sample of 116 countries, find that remittance flows have been destabilizing or have had 
no effect on output volatility in 80 percent of the countries they examined. 
  Our own work is in the spirit of Bugamelli and Paterno (2008), but we build on their 
work by focusing on worker remittances (scaled by GDP) as the dependent variable, rather than 
the sum of remittances and employee compensation, by significantly expanding the set of control 
variables to reflect the findings of the literature reviewed in this section, by using panel data, by 
examining the robustness of our results to alternative estimation strategies and country samples, 
and by considering an alternative strategy to address the potential endogeneity of remittance 
flows, in the form of GMM estimation.
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III.   ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION 
This section reports the results of cross-section OLS regressions explaining the standard 
deviation of real per capita GDP growth over the 1970–2004 period for a sample of 70 countries, 
initially including 16 advanced economies and 54 developing countries.
4  We focus on the pre-
global financial crisis period because macroeconomic volatility increased in all countries in this 
period, which was also associated with widespread declines in remittance flows. Including this 
                                                 
3 The important differences in the behavior of workers’ remittances and employee compensation are described by 
Chami and others (2008), who emphasize the pitfalls in aggregating these two types of current account flows. 
4 Our sample is restricted by the availability of separate data on workers’ remittances, rather than the sum of 
remittances and employee compensation, which are aggregated in the BOP accounts of a large number of countries. period in the sample would therefore bias the results toward finding a negative relationship 
between remittances and volatility that could be spurious.  Our concern is with the role of the 
ratio of workers’ remittances to GDP in these regressions, but as indicated above, to avoid 
omitted variable bias we control for a large number of variables that have been used in other 
studies examining output volatility, as described in the previous section. Our control variables 
include relative income, relative income squared, terms of trade volatility, trade openness, 
financial openness, government consumption, institutional quality, an indicator of financial 
sector development, a trade concentration ratio, and an indicator of the commodity composition 
of exports (a data appendix contains data sources and variable definitions).  
We begin with cross-section estimation.  The explanatory variables are constructed as 
averages over the 1970–2004 period except for the relative income variable, which is measured 
by its value in 1970. We require that at least fifteen years of data are available to calculate the 
average of a variable. Also, the average of a variable is calculated including only those years for 
which the data are not missing for all the explanatory variables included in the regression. Table 
1 reports output volatility and the average ratio of workers remittances to GDP over the 1970-
2004 period for each country in the sample. The average remittance flow into the 70 countries 
over the 1970-2004 sample period is 1.7 percent of GDP, compared with a median flow of 0.4 
percent of GDP. The three largest recipients of remittances relative to GDP in our sample over 
this period were, in order, Jordan (19 percent of GDP), Egypt (8.2 percent of GDP), and El 
Salvador (7 percent of GDP). The data show that some industrial countries also received 
substantial remittances (Portugal, 5.7 percent of GDP, Greece, 2.1 percent of GDP, Cyprus, 0.6 
percent of GDP, and Spain, 0.5 percent of GDP). The average volatility of per capita output growth is 4.4 percent for the 1980-2004 period and compares with a median of 3.6 percent. Table 
2 provides descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables included in the regressions. 
 
As a first step, we estimate an OLS regression that includes all the possible explanatory 
variables in the regression. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 3. The remittance 
variable has a negative coefficient with a p-value of 0.12 percent.  Column 2 differs from column 
1 in that the former includes an interaction term between government consumption and an 
industrial-country dummy, to allow for the possibility that procyclicality in government spending 
in developing countries may cause the effect of the size of the government sector on 
macroeconomic volatility to differ in the two types of countries. This modification did not prove 
to be important and left the estimated effect of remittance flows on growth volatility unchanged. 
As seen in columns 1 and 2, the key control variables appear to be those related to the country’s 
external trade – i.e., the share of primary commodities in exports, degree of trade openness, and 
terms of trade volatility. The point estimate of the coefficient on the ratio of worker remittances 
to GDP is negative in both cases, and is statistically significant at the 95 percent level when the 
effects of the share of government consumption in GDP are allowed to differ between industrial 
and developing countries (column 2).  
 
Preferred specifications are obtained after dropping insignificant variables and restricting 
the countries included in the regression sample to be the same as for the regression that includes 
all of the explanatory variables. Column 3 drops all insignificant control variables except the 
government consumption variables from the regression and is our preferred OLS specification 
for the full sample. Among the control variables, only the trade and fiscal variables provide significant explanatory power. The key result, however, is that the effect of workers’ remittances 
continues not only to be negative and statistically significant, but essentially unchanged in 
magnitude. Thus, a higher ratio of remittances to GDP tends to reduce the volatility of real GDP 
growth, after controlling for other statistically significant determinants of growth volatility. 
 
The full sample includes both industrial and developing countries, but as shown in 
column 4, this result is unchanged when the sample is restricted to developing countries, with the 
magnitude of the coefficient on the remittance variable essentially identical to that for the full 
sample. Indeed, the stabilizing effects of remittance flows are actually significantly stronger than 
these results would suggest, because the estimated coefficient of the remittance ratio is 
significantly affected by a single outlier. Specifically, Jordan is by far the largest remittance 
recipient in the sample, but also happens to be characterized by substantial volatility in GDP 
growth during the sample period. Omitting Jordan from the sample, as in column 5, almost 
doubles the absolute value of the coefficient of the remittance ratio in the full sample and 
increases its statistical significance to the 99 percent level. Finally, including a variable capturing 
discretionary fiscal policy volatility tends to weaken the effect of many of the explanatory 
variables, but the findings on the remittance variable are robust to the inclusion of the fiscal 
volatility variable (columns 6 and 7). Indeed, even though Jordan is excluded in these regressions 
because of lack of data, the coefficient of the remittance variable is comparable to that in column 
5 and is significant at the 99 percent level of confidence.  
 
The results of the cross-country OLS regressions therefore identify a negative partial 
relationship between workers’ remittances and the volatility of output growth, and this relationship can be estimated rather precisely. Giving this relationship a causal interpretation, an 
increase in the workers’ remittances-to-GDP ratio of one percentage point would lead to a 
reduction of about 0.3 in the standard deviation of GDP growth, according to the preferred 
regression results.  This represents a 7 percent reduction in growth volatility relative to the 
average in the sample. 
 
IV.   GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS PANEL ESTIMATION 
Such  a  causal  interpretation  may  not  be  warranted,  of  course.  If  macroeconomic  volatility 
increases emigration, or if migrant remittances are motivated by altruism—a desire by migrants 
to  compensate  family  when  they  encounter  bad  times,  including  an  uncertain  economic 
environment—remittance  inflows  may  increase  in  response  to  increased  macroeconomic 
volatility in the recipient country. In this case, estimates of the effect of remittances on output 
volatility derived from OLS estimation may be biased upwards (making them less negative or 
more positive than the underlying true parameter). If this bias is present, therefore, the stabilizing 
effects of remittance flows may actually be understated by the results of the last section. 
 
Research  on  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  remittances  has  addressed  this  problem 
through the use of instrumental variables. Two key features govern the selection of an instrument 
for  remittances:  the  instrument  must  be  correlated  with  remittances,  and  it  must  satisfy  an 
exclusion  restriction—its  effect  on  individual  country  growth  volatility  must  operate  solely 
through its effect on remittances and should not be otherwise correlated with output volatility in individual countries.
5 Previous authors have used time-invariant variables such as proxies for 
geographic distance from host countries such as latitude (e.g., Bugamelli and Paterno, 2008), or 
migrant-weighted GDP in host countries (Aggarwal and others, 2006).  However, the former is 
likely to be weakly correlated with remittance flows, and the latter is unlikely to satisfy exclusion 
restrictions,  since  recipient  countries  are  likely  to  be  economically  linked  to  host  countries 
through a variety of channels in addition to remittance flows. 
 
In light of these potential pitfalls, we have opted instead for a  GMM panel estimation 
approach.  A GMM panel method has several advantages over OLS as a statistical approach to 
examining the relationship between remittances and output volatility. First, estimation using 
panel data—that is, pooled cross-section and time series data—allows one to exploit the time 
series nature of the relationship between remittances and output volatility. Since the magnitude 
of remittance flows has changed substantially over time, this is an important advantage. Second, 
the GMM panel estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of the remittance variable as 
well as the other explanatory variables. The GMM regression specifications reported in the paper 
control for the endogeniety of the remittances-to-GDP and the trade openness variables (in line 
with previous studies that have included trade openness, e.g. Calderon and others, 2005). The 
results reported here are robust to controlling only for endogeneity of the remittances-to-GDP 
ratio. 
 
In order to conduct the GMM estimations, the data are organized into a panel consisting 
of 70 countries over the 1980-2004 period (the 1970s data are dropped in the panel estimations 
                                                 
5 Hakura (2009) shows that output volatility in developing countries is mostly explained by country-specific effects. 
Therefore, a downturn in one developing country which could trigger higher remittances is not highly correlated 
with high output volatility in all other low-income countries which would trigger higher total remittances. because the remittance data are missing for many countries during those years). The data are 
averaged over non-overlapping five-year periods so that -- data permitting-- there are five 
observations per country (1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004). Table 
4 provides a description of the data. 
 
The regression is specified as follows: 
 
  , , , i t i t i i t v X b h e ¢ = + +    
 
where  , i t v  is the volatility of output growth, measured as the standard deviation of the growth 
rate over the relevant five-year period; X represents the set of explanatory variables discussed 
previously;  i h  is an unobserved country-specific effect; e  is a time- and country-specific error 
term; and the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively. Time period 
dummies are also included to capture period-specific effects.  
 
The standard assumptions that (i) the error term is not serially correlated; and (ii) the 
explanatory variables are weakly exogenous (i.e. they are uncorrelated with future realizations of 
the error term), yield the following moment conditions: 
 
, , , 1 [ ( )] 0 i t s i t i t E X e e - - × - =     where i = 1,…, N,  t = 3,…,T and  2 s ³ . 
 This condition allows the use of suitably lagged levels of the variables as instruments, after the 
equation has been first-differenced to eliminate the country-specific effects. The explanatory 
variables are the same as in the case of the OLS cross-section regression estimation of the last 
section, with the exception of the indicator of the commodity composition of exports, which is 
fixed for each country over time and, therefore drops out in the first differenced equations. 
 
It is worth noting that, while the GMM difference estimator has important advantages for 
our purposes, it is also subject to some important shortcomings. Specifically, the difference 
estimator has been found to have poor finite sample properties (bias and imprecision) when the 
lagged levels of the series are only weakly correlated with subsequent first differences, and 
therefore make weak instruments. This has been found to be the case when the explanatory 
variables are highly persistent or close to a random walk. To reduce the potential biases and 
imprecision associated with the difference GMM estimator, an extended GMM estimator is used 
that combines in a system the regression in differences with one in levels (see Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). The instruments for the regressions in differences are suitably lagged levels of the 
series, as described above. The instruments for the regressions in levels are in turn suitably 
lagged first differences of the variables. These are appropriate instruments assuming that 
0 ] [ , = D i t i x E h , which yields the additional moment conditions:  
 
  0 )] ( [ . , = + D - t i i s t i x E e h for s = 1.   
 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments. We test the 
validity of the instruments using three specification tests. The first is the standard Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the 
sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. The second test, the 
difference Sargan test, examines the validity of the additional moment conditions imposed in the 
levels equations by the system GMM estimator. The third test examines the hypothesis that there 
is no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals.  
 
The system panel results are reported in Table 5. The table reports five sets of estimates. 
In the first column, we present OLS panel estimates for the full sample. The signs of the 
parameter estimates are the same as those in the cross-section regressions. Most importantly, the 
coefficient on the remittance ratio remains negative, though it is not significant at standard levels 
in this case. The second column presents within-group estimates, which eliminate cross-sectional 
variation by introducing country fixed effects. These estimates yield similar results, except that 
the control variable capturing trade openness now becomes significant. Columns 3-5 report the 
GMM system estimates, with columns 3 including the full sample, column 4 excluding Jordan 
and column 5 reporting results only for developing countries. These results confirm the findings 
from the cross-section OLS regressions. The remittances variable is negative and statistically 
significant at standard levels in all three of these regressions. The magnitude of the effect of 
remittances on volatility is very similar across these three regressions, and the pattern of 
coefficients on the control variables is similar as well. Thus, the full-sample GMM results are 
robust to dropping industrial countries from the sample and excluding Jordan. Notice in 
particular that while the coefficient on the remittance variable is very similar across the three 
samples used in the GMM regressions, it is much larger in absolute value in the GMM regressions than in the OLS and within-group regressions, supporting our conjecture that OLS 
estimation tends to understate the effects of remittance flows on growth volatility.  
 
The panel GMM system estimates pass the specification tests. The Hansen test and the 
difference Sargan tests, which focus on the additional instruments used by the system, do not 
reject the validity of the instruments. The additional instruments in the system GMM therefore 
seem to be valid and highly informative. The serial correlation tests also do not reject the 
econometric model due to serial correlation.   
 
V.   TESTING FOR NONLINEAR EFFECTS 
There is some evidence that the macroeconomic effects of worker remittances in the recipient 
economies may depend on the size of remittance flows – i.e., the effects of the remittance 
variable may be nonlinear (see Abdih and others, 2008, Chami and others, 2006 and 2008). If 
this nonlinearity extends to the effects of remittance inflows on the volatility of GDP growth, the 
results of the previous section may disguise some heterogeneity in the stabilizing effects of 
remittance inflows. Chami and others (2006, 2008), using a stochastic dynamic general 
equilibrium model with endogenous labor supply, show that at a high level of remittance-to-GDP 
ratio may actually enhance output volatility due to the negative impact of these flows on the 
labor supply of remittance-dependent households. Abdih and others (2008) show that high levels 
of remittance-to-GDP may actually lead to higher levels of corruption. One possible explanation 
could be that countries that over a long sample period had high remittances have felt less need 
for reforms and thus have left the economy with a narrow base prone to exogenous shocks.  
 To test for the existence of a nonlinear effect of remittances on growth volatility using the 
OLS and GMM system estimators, the remittance variable is interacted with a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for remittance ratios greater than r* percent and zero otherwise, and this 
interaction term is included as an additional explanatory variable in the regressions reported 
earlier. Remittance cutoffs from 0.5 to 0.5 percent below the maximum value of the remittance 
ratio to GDP in the sample (the highest feasible cutoff) are explored, by increments of 0.5 
percent. The test for no nonlinear effect amounts simply to the test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the interactive variable is equal to zero. Under OLS, the optimal cutoff is the one 
that minimizes the residual sum of squares. Under the GMM  system estimator, the optimal 
cutoff is the one that minimizes the Hansen test statistic when the same instrument set is used in 
all the equations. The tests for the optimal cutoff instrument the interactive remittance variable 
using lagged levels and lagged differences of the square of the remittances to GDP ratio in the 
differenced and level regressions respectively. Once the optimal cutoff is selected, the 
instruments of the interactive remittance variable are allowed to be the lagged level and 
differences of the variable itself.  
 
The OLS results are reported in Table 6, for the full sample and excluding Jordan. The 
optimal cutoff value for the remittance variable that minimized the sum of squared residuals in 
the regression proved to be 2 percent of GDP. Using this cutoff value generated results that were 
very similar to those derived previously. Again, all of the control variables have the expected 
sign and the signs of the coefficients on both remittance variables (above and below the cutoff 
value) are negative and significant at the one percent level. The intriguing result is that the effect 
of remittance inflows on growth volatility indeed appears to be highly nonlinear: in countries where remittance inflows exceed 2 percent of GDP an additional percentage point of GDP of 
remittance inflows has a much weaker moderating effect on growth volatility than in countries 
that receive inflows of less than 2 percent of GDP. Thus remittance inflows are stabilizing on 
average for all recipients, but the stabilizing effects of remittance inflows appear to be achieved 
rather quickly (i.e., at relatively low remittance-to-GDP ratios) and to weaken when inflows are 
very large. 
 
The GMM estimates are reported in Table 7, once again for panels with the full sample, 
excluding Jordan, and only including developing countries. The nonlinear effect appears to be 
even stronger in the GMM estimates than in the OLS estimations. The stabilizing effects of an 
additional percentage point of remittance inflows on the volatility of GDP growth appear to be 
almost a full order of magnitude smaller in countries that receive inflows in excess of 2 percent 
of GDP than in countries with inflows below 2 percent of GDP. 
 
VI.   AN APPLICATION: REMITTANCES AND OUTPUT STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA 
The nonlinearity in the effects of remittances on growth volatility may play an important role in 
interpreting the welfare effects of remittance flows in specific contexts.  As an example, this 
section considers the contribution of remittance receipts to macroeconomic stability in countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
Remittance flows into MENA countries have been large and relatively stable during the 
1975-2004 period. However, this is where the nonlinearity in the effects of remittances on 
growth stability becomes important. Because the level of remittance inflows exceeded 2 percent of GDP throughout the period, we estimate that the contribution of such inflows to reducing 
volatility has in fact been lower for countries in the MENA region than for developing countries 
elsewhere over much of the 1975-2000 period (Table 8). Developing countries in Asia and the 
Western Hemisphere are only now starting to receive remittances in excess of 2 percent of GDP, 
suggesting that the volatility-reducing effects of remittances in these regions may also be 
declining. 
Nonetheless, impacts on volatility can remain important when changes in remittance 
flows are large, even when countries are already large inflow recipients. For example, many 
MENA countries receive a large amount of their remittance inflows from GCC oil exporting 
countries. Consequently, periods with high oil prices have been associated with substantial 
increases in remittance flows to these countries, and the most recent period of high oil prices was 
no exception. Remittances increased in MENA countries such as Pakistan (from 2 percent of 
GDP in 2001 to 4 percent of GDP in 2006) and Egypt (from 3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 5 
percent of GDP in 2006) by about 2 percent of GDP over the last five years. Applying the 
relevant coefficient estimate from Table 7, this suggests that the increase in remittance flows 
may have contributed to a reduction in growth volatility by about 0.4 percent for these countries 
respectively in these years. 
 
VII.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have provided evidence that remittance flows have indeed contributed on average to 
reducing the volatility of GDP growth in remittance-receiving countries, even after controlling 
for a large number of other potential determinants of growth volatility and taking into account 
the possible effect that growth volatility may itself exert on remittance flows. This provides an important channel through which remittance inflows may affect both growth and welfare in 
remittance-receiving countries. 
 
However, the evidence on the existence of threshold effects suggests that the stability-
enhancing effects of remittances appear to be achieved rather quickly, so whatever benefits may 
be associated with very large remittance flows, enhanced macroeconomic stability may not loom 
large among them. This emphasizes the importance of strengthening macroeconomic resilience 
through other means in countries that are very large recipients of remittances. Fortunately, 
remittance resources may themselves provide the means to do so, including possibly through 
broad-based taxation of consumption, increases in which have been financed in many countries 
from remittance inflows. An efficient VAT with limited exemptions could net for the domestic 
government a substantial share of the resources received through remittance inflows by countries 
that are large remittance recipients. These resources could be used to boost the human capital of 
the domestic population by improving health and education services, to alleviate infrastructure 
bottlenecks, and to improve the business climate so as to maximize the spillover effects of 












   Table 1: Output Volatility and Workers Remittances 
 
Country  Output volatility  Workers    Country  Output volatility  Workers 
  (std. deviation  remittances to GDP,      (std. deviation  remittances to GDP,
  of per capita   averages 1970–2004    of per capita  average 1970–2004 
   output growth,         output growth,   
    1970–2004)           1970–2004)    
Chile  6.7  0    Niger  7.2  0.4 
Denmark  2.2  0    Spain  1.7  0.5 
Finland  3.5  0    Paraguay  3.5  0.5 
Iran  8.7  0    New Zealand  2.3  0.5 
Kenya  3.1  0    Cyprus  5.2  0.6 
Malaysia  2.8  0    Colombia  1.9  0.9 
Papua New Guinea 14.5  0    Peru  5.8  1.0 
Syria  6.9  0    Mexico  3.6  1.0 
United States  2.8  0    Uganda  4.7  1.2 
Venezuela  5.6  0    Philippines  4.2  1.3 
Cote d`Ivoire  6.1  0    Nigeria  6.1  1.4 
Japan  2.0  0.004    Malta  5.5  1.5 
Ireland  3.3  0.01    India  2.2  1.5 
Thailand  3.1  0.01    Togo  5.3  1.6 
Norway  1.9  0.01    Guatemala  2.2  1.6 
Malawi  6.7  0.02    Ecuador  3.4  1.8 
Gabon  7.1  0.02    Greece  2.5  2.1 
Zimbabwe  9.7  0.02    Turkey  4.1  2.1 
Hungary  3.6  0.02    Senegal  5.0  2.5 
Sweden  2.0  0.02    Sudan  4.4  2.7 
Argentina  6.4  0.04    Honduras  3.9  2.8 
France  1.4  0.1    Mali  5.6  3.9 
Republic of Korea  4.3  0.1    Tunisia  1.5  4.2 
Ethiopia  10.3  0.1    Dominican Republic 3.5  4.7 
Madagascar  3.4  0.1    Sri Lanka  3.1  5.0 
Cameroon  7.4  0.1    Nicaragua  3.9  5.0 
Austria  2.0  0.2    Pakistan  2.0  5.0 
Italy  1.9  0.2    Jamaica  3.5  5.2 
Ghana  7.3  0.2    Burkina Faso  3.5  5.7 
Panama  4.7  0.2    Portugal  3.1  5.7 
Trinidad &Tobago  9.2  0.3    Morocco  4.8  6.6 
Belgium  1.7  0.3    El Salvador  2.9  7.0 
Indonesia  4.2  0.3    Egypt  2.7  8.2 
Bolivia  1.8  0.4    Jordan  6.8  19.0 
Poland  3.1  0.4         
Costa Rica  3.5  0.4    Average  4.4  1.7 
            Median  3.6  0.4 
 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 1970 – 2004  
(70 Observations) 
 
Variable  Mean    Maximum     Minimum   Standard  
         Value     Value     Deviation 
               
Output Volatility (standard deviation of per capita GDP growth)  4.4    14.5    1.4    2.4 
Workers’ remittances to GDP  1.7    19.0    0    2.9 
Relative initial income (income relative to U.S. in 1970)  0.3    1.0    0.03    0.3 
Relative initial income squared  0.1    1.0    0.001    0.2 
Primary commodity export composition  38.1    98.2    0.8    30.2 
Trade concentration ratio  1.9    4.2    0.0    0.9 
Terms of trade volatility  11.3    29.4    1.7    6.7 
Trade openness to GDP  62.9    215.9    11.9    35.2 
Private credit to GDP  0.4    1.5    0.03    0.3 
Bureaucracy quality  6.7    12    0    3.1 
Financial openness (the stock of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP) 130.7    721.8    31.2    106.4 
Government consumption to GDP  20.7    54.8    7.3    7.7 
Government consumption to GDP*industrial country dummy  4.3    25.7    0.0    8.2 







    Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
Dependent Variable is: Volatility of Output Growth, 1970 – 2004 
 
   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS     
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)     
Workers remittances to GDP  -0.17  -0.17 * -0.164*  -0.17  -0.31** -0.31** -0.36**     
  (0.11)  (0.10)  0.098  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)     
Relative initial income (1970)  1.27  1.61               
  (3.92)  (3.80)               
Relative initial income squared  -3.45  -2.74               
  (3.70)  (3.42)               
Primary commodity export 
composition  0.02 *  0.02  0.016*  0.02*  0.02**  0.02**  0.01     
  (0.01)  (0.01)  0.009  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)     
Trade concentration ratio  -0.24  -0.29               
  (0.34)  (0.34)               
Terms of trade volatility  0.09 *  0.09 *  0.09*  0.09*  0.07*  0.06  0.04     
  (0.05)  (0.05)  0.046  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)     
Trade openness to GDP  0.02 ** 0.01 *  0.012*  0.01*  0.01*  0.01  0.01     
  (0.01)  (0.01)  0.006  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)     
Private credit to GDP  -1.00  -0.68               
  (1.05)  (0.98)               
Bureaucracy quality  0.09  0.12               
  (0.19)  (0.20)               
Financial openness  -0.002  0.00               
  (0.00)  (0.00)               
Government consumption to 
GDP  0.06  0.06  0.066*  0.07  0.04  0.06  0.06     
  (0.04)  (0.04)  0.038  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
Government consumption to 
GDP*industrial country dummy    -0.06  -0.064**    -0.07** -0.09**  -0.01     
    (0.06)  0.028    (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)     
Volatility of discretionary fiscal 
policy              1.48**     
              (0.46)     
Constant  1.28  1.19  1.189  1.15  2.06*  2.19*  -0.54     
  (2.17)  (2.17)  1.061  (1.23)  (1.11)  (1.24)  (1.11)     
R-squared  0.39  0.40  0.37  0.26  0.40  0.40  0.46     
Number of observations  70  70  70  54  69  61  61     
Countries excluded        Industrial Jordan         
            countries       
Notes: Output growth volatility is the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth over 1970-2004. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. See Data appendix for variable definitions. A * denotes significance at the 10 
percent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.  
 Table 4: Panel Data Description, 1980 – 2004 
(5-year period observations, 330 observations) 
 
Variable  Mean   Maximum  Minimum  Standard 
      Value  Value  Deviation 
         
Output Volatility (standard deviation of per capita GDP growth)  3.4  18.7  0.3  2.7 
Workers remittances to GDP  1.8  22.3  0.0  3.4 
Terms of trade volatility  9.6  57.1  0.6  8.2 
Trade openness to GDP  64.5  227.1  10.3  38.8 
Government consumption to GDP  20.7  59.3  4.7  8.2 
Government consumption to GDP*industrial country dummy  4.1  27.6  0.0  8.1 
              
 Table 5: Panel Regression Results 
Dependent Variable is: Volatility of Output Growth, 1980 – 2004 
(5-year period observations) 
 
  OLS Levels  Within Groups   GMM-SYS    GMM-SYS  GMM-SYS 
                                
                     
Workers remittances to GDP  -0.06    -0.08    -0.17  **  -0.19  **  -0.15  * 
  (0.05)    (0.06)    (0.08)    (0.07)    0.09   
Terms of trade volatility  0.10  **  0.10  **  0.09  **  0.08  **  0.08  ** 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    0.03   
Trade openness to GDP  0.00    0.02  **  0.01    0.01    0.00   
  (0.00)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    0.01   
Government consumption to GDP  0.03    0.05    0.03  *  0.02    0.03   
  (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.02)    (0.02)    0.02   
Government consumption to 
GDP*industrial country dummy  -0.07  **  0.17  *  -0.08  **  -0.08  **     
  (0.02)    (0.10)    (0.02)    (0.02)       
Constant  2.42    -0.35    2.31  **  2.68  **  3.0  ** 
  (0.69)    (1.16)    (0.81)    (0.88)    0.9   
Diagnostic statistics                     
R-squared  0.24    0.14    -    -    -   
# observations  330    330    330    325    258   
# countries  70    70    70    69    54   
Countries excluded              Jordan    Industrial  
                  countries  
Minimum # observations per country  2    2    2    2    3   
Average # observations per country  4.7    4.7    4.7    4.7    4.8   
Maximum # observations per country  5    5    5    5    5   
                     
Hansen test  -    -    5.21    6.69    5.50   
A-B test for AR(1)  -    -    -3.26  **  -3.27  **  -3.14  ** 
A-B test for AR(2)  -     -     -1.12     -1.09     -0.92    
Notes: Output growth volatility is the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth over five year periods. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See Data appendix for variable definitions. A * denotes significance at the 
10 percent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Period dummies are included in the estimations 
 Table 6: Nonlinear Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
Dependent Variable is: Volatility of Output Growth, 1970 – 2004 
 
   OLS     OLS        
Workers remittances to GDP(wrgdp)*dummy =1 if wrgdp <=2%  (α)  -1.41  **  -1.51 **     
  (0.51)    (0.50)      
Workers remittances to GDP (wrgdp) *dummy =1 if wrgdp >2% (β)  -0.21  **  -0.35 **     
  (0.10)    (0.12)      
Terms of trade volatility  0.10  **  0.08  *     
  (0.05)    (0.04)      
Trade openness to GDP  0.01  **  0.01       
  (0.01)    (0.01)      
Primary commodity export composition  0.01    0.02  *     
  (0.01)    (0.01)      
Government consumption to GDP  0.08  **  0.06       
  (0.04)    (0.04)      
Government consumption to GDP*industrial country dummy  -0.08  **  -0.08 **     
  (0.03)    (0.03)      
Constant  1.33    2.14  **     
  (0.98)    (1.04)      
R-squared  0.43    0.45       
Number of observations  70    69       
F test α=β  7.1  **  6.9  **     
Countries excluded        Jordan        
Notes: Output growth volatility is the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth over 1970-2004.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See Data appendix for variable definitions.        
A * denotes significance at the 10 percent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.    
 
  Table 7: Nonlinear GMM System Estimation 
Dependent Variable is: Volatility of Output Growth, 1980 – 2004 
(5-year period observations) 
 
             
Workers remittances to GDP(wrgdp) 
*dummy=1 if wrgdp <=2% 
-1.43  **  -1.59  **  -1.45  ** 
  (0.69)    (0.68)    (0.49)   
Workers remittances to GDP (wrgdp) * 
dummy=1 if wrgdp>2%  -0.19  **  -0.17  **  -0.19  * 
  (0.09)    (0.08)    (0.11)   
Terms of trade volatility  0.10  **  0.10  **  0.09  ** 
  (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)   
Trade openness to GDP  0.011    0.01    0.00   
  (0.008)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
Government consumption to GDP  0.03  *  0.03    0.03   
  (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)   
Government consumption to 
GDP*industrial country dummy  -0.09  **  -0.09  **     
  (0.02)    (0.02)       
Constant  2.32  **  2.39    3.09  ** 
  (0.89)    (0.89)    0.88   
Diagnostic statistics             
# observations  330    325    258   
# countries  70    69    54   
Minimum # observations per country  2    2    3   
Average # observations per country  4.7    4.71    4.78   
Maximum # observations per country  5    5    5   
Countries excluded      Jordan    Industrial countries 
             
Hansen test  12.18    13.41    8.04   
A-B test for AR(1)  -3.34  **  -3.34  **  -3.26  ** 
A-B test for AR(2)  -0.98    -0.92    -0.79   
                    
Notes: Output growth volatility is the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth over five year 
periods. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See Data appendix for variable definitions. A * 
denotes significance at the 10 percent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Period 
dummies are included in the estimations. 
 Table 8: Estimated Impact of Remittances on Volatility 
 
   Developing Asia  Industrial countries  MENA  Transition countries  Africa  Western Hemisphere 
1975-1979  -0.64  -1.45  -0.93    -0.7  -0.43 
1980-1984  -1.99  -1.67  -1.10    -0.8  -0.56 
1985-1989  -1.95  -1.35  -0.89  0  -1.0  -1.20 
1990-1994  -2.13  -1.02  -0.80  -0.08  -1.2  -2.39 
1995-1999  -2.56  -0.75  -0.79  -0.37  -1.4  -0.52 
2000-2004  -0.54  -0.52  -0.86  -0.71  -2.8  -0.88 
 Data Appendix 
 
This appendix provides the definition and data sources for the variables used in the regressions 
that are reported in the paper. It also defines the country groupings. With the exception of the 
output volatility and the terms of trade volatility variables, the data are averaged over the 1970–
2004 period, unless otherwise indicated, for the cross-section OLS regressions. For the variables 
that are included in the GMM panel estimations outside of the volatility variables, the data are 
averaged over non-overlapping five-year periods (1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-
1999, and 2000-2004). 
 
A.   Data Definitions and Sources 
Variables included in the preferred regression specification 
 
Volatility of per capita output growth is defined as the standard deviation of annual real GDP per 
capita growth over the 1970–2004 period in the OLS cross-section regressions and over each 5-
year period in the GMM estimations. Per capita real GDP growth is measured using data on real 
per capita GDP in constant dollars (international prices, base year 2000) obtained from the Penn 
World Tables (PWT), Version 6.2.  
 
Workers remittances is the ratio of workers remittances to GDP. The source of the data is the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
Terms of trade volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the annual change in 
the terms of trade over the 1970–2004 period in the OLS cross-section regressions and over each 
5-year period in the GMM estimations. The source of the data is the IMF’s WEO database. 
 
Trade openness is defined as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services 
divided by GDP in constant 2000 prices. The source of the data is the Penn World Tables, 
Version 6.2. 
 
The commodity export composition is the share of primary commodities in total exports. For 
each country, the average share of primary commodity exports in total exports over the 1999-
2004 period is calculated. The calculations are based on information on 44 commodities. The 
source of the data is the UN Comtrade database. 
 
Government consumption is the ratio of government consumption to GDP in constant 2000 
prices. The source of the data is the Penn World Tables (PWT), Version 6.2. 
 
Variables not included in the preferred regression specification 
 
Relative income is the level of real per capita income relative to the United States (squared). The 
data on real per capita GDP in constant 2000 prices is obtained from Penn World Tables, 
Version 6.2. 
 
Relative income squared is the square of relative income.  
Trade concentration ratio is the ratio of exports to a country’s three largest trading partners in 
total exports. The source of the data is the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
Financial openness is defined as the ratio of the stock of foreign liabilities and foreign assets to 
GDP. The source of the data is Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
 
Financial sector development is proxied by the average ratio of private sector credit 
to GDP. The source of the data is Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006). 
 
Institutional quality is proxied by an indicator of bureaucracy quality—the strength and expertise 
of the bureaucracy to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services. Alternative indicators of institutional quality also examined in the paper include the 
following: (1) an index of corruption—the degree of all forms of corruption such as patronage, 
nepotism, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business; (2) an index of the rule of 
law—the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the extent of popular observance of 
the law; and (3) an aggregate index of institutional quality constructed as the equally weighted 
average of the bureaucracy quality, corruption, and rule of law indices. The indices are reported 
in the International Country Risk Guide. Each index is constructed as the average over the 1984-
2005 period. The indices are re-scaled from 1 to 12, where high values indicate good institutions.  
 
Volatility in discretionary fiscal spending is measured as the standard deviation of 
cyclically-adjusted government spending over the 1960–2000 period from Fatás and 
Mihov (2003). 
 
B.   Country Coverage 
The section lists all the countries included in the paper. The set of countries included is 
determined by the availability of the data for all the explanatory variables. 
 
Industrial countries (16): 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. 
 
Developing countries (54): 
 
Africa  
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. 
 
Asia  
India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.  
 
Middle East and North Africa  Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
 
Transition countries  
Hungary and Poland. 
 
Western Hemisphere 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
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